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THE USE OF PROCEDURE TO EFFECT EQUITY: SECTION
1605(b) OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
OF 1976
LYDIA M.- VALENTI
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) was signed
into law on October 21, 19761 and became effective on January 19,
1977.2 The purpose of the Act was to codify the restrictive theory
of sovereign immunity. The Act attempted to strike a balance be-
tween the need to redress wrongs done to an individual' by a for-
eign sovereign in the course of its commercial pursuits and the
need to diminish a potential for serious friction in the United
States' foreign relations caused by shotgun attachments of the for-
eign sovereign's assets by the injured party.'
Congress addressed this dilemma, as it affects admiralty suits
brought to enforce a maritime lien, by enacting section 1605(b).
Congress designed section 1605(b) specifically to avoid initiation of
a suit8 by arrest of the vessel or cargo6 of a foreign sovereign
1. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as FSIA]. In the section-by-section analysis, Congress recognized that prior to the
FSIA, the law in the United States did not 1) provide a plaintiff with a means to initiate a
suit against a foreign state defendant, 2) provide a standard to be used in a foreign sover-
eign immunity determination, and 3) provide a method of execution against a foreign sover-
eign's commercial assets. H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep.].
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1602. See also Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor to the Department of State,
to the Attorney General, Department of State Pub. Notice No. 507 (November 10, 1976),
reprinted in 1976 AMERICAN MARITIME CASES 2362 [hereinafter Leigh].
3. See Comment, The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J.
1148 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdictional Immunity]. Prior to the FSIA, commenta-
tors alleged that the courts failed to reconcile the policy of appeasing the sensitivities of
foreign governments with the policy of meeting the injured party's needs. See also Lauter-
pacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L.
220 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Lauterpacht]. Professor Lauterpacht argued that the sover-
eign's perogatives "denie[d] to the individual legal remedies for the vindication of his rights
as against the state in the matter both of contract and tort." Id. at 220.
4. Jet Line Services, Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1174 (D. Md.
1978). Shotgun attachments are those proceedings in rem by a plaintiff against the various
assets of a defendant in order to secure jurisdiction over him, even when these assets did not
give rise to the dispute.
5. Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1959). The
court recognized that a party could have the property of a foreign sovereign attached for
jurisdictional purposes, as long as the property was within the United States, of a commer-
cial nature, and the sovereign was not immune.
6. In Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605
F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1979), the court said:
[I~t might be argued that the general exception to the jurisdictional immunity
of a foreign state in § 1605(b) of the Immunities Act which permits enforcement
against a "vessel or cargo" would also include freights substituted for the cargo.
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through an in rem proceeding. Instead of the traditional in rem
proceeding, Congress provided a statutory procedure whereby the
court could obtain in personam jurisdiction over the foreign sover-
eign, and the plaintiff then could have his day in court.
This comment reviews the history of foreign sovereign immunity.
It traces its development from absolute immunity to a position of
restrictive immunity and then to the codification of the United
States' position on foreign sovereign immunity. It discusses how
the historical development of sovereign immunity shaped the en-
actment of section 1605(b). Finally, this comment analyzes the sur-
prisingly few cases which have judicially construed section 1605(b)
of the FSIA in light of historical precedent, fundamental policies,
and legislative intent.8 It concludes that judicial construction, by
and large, has resulted in equitable resolutions consistent with the
purposes of the statute's enactment.
I. HISTORY
Some of the most important court opinions which shaped the
sovereign immunity theory were announced in proceedings in rem
against ships.9 Indeed, the "absolute" sovereign immunity theory
in the United States originated from Schooner Exchange v. Mc-
Faddon.'0 The libellant in Schooner Exchange premised his suit
for attachment on a claim of title and sought the arrest of a foreign
public vessel." The Supreme Court held that even though this ves-
sel was within the territory of the United States, it was exempt
But the point was not argued and we leave the answer for another day. The anal-
ogy is strong, at least, in assessing congressional intent.
Id. at 654 n.6.
7. The basic jurisdiction-conferring provision of the FSIA is § 1330(a) in which the court
obtains subject matter jurisdiction over claims against a foreign sovereign once it has been
established that the sovereign is not entitled to immunity under sections 1605-07. The FSIA
does not, however, "provide a cause of action or dictate substantive rules of liability." Ve-
lidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1981).
8. Though § 1605(b) has been in effect for four years at this writing, only the following
cases have cited it, and fewer still of these have construed it: Velidor, 653 F.2d 812; Amoco
Overseas, 605 F.2d 648; Comite Assureurs Maritimes Marseilles v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, No. MCA81-0215 (N.D. Fla. July 13, 1981); China Nat'l Chem. Import & Export
Corp. v. M/V Lago Hualaihue, 504 F. Supp. 684 (D. Md. 1981); E-Systems, Inc. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 491 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Willamette Transport, Inc. v. Compa-
nia Anonima Venezolana de Navegacion, 491 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. La. 1980); Jet Line, 462 F.
Supp. 1165.
9. Jurisdictional Immunity, supra note 3, at 1150.
10. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
11. Plaintiffs argued that while on a lawful and peaceful voyage the vessel to which they
claimed ownership was forcibly taken under the orders of Napoleon and made a public ves-
sel of France. Id. at 117.
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from arrest because "[a] foreign sovereign is not understood as in-
tending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his
dignity, and the dignity of his nation." 12
In fact, the underlying rationale of this decision was an out-
growth of the surviving feudal principle that the king, who personi-
fied the State, could do no wrong,18 and that the exercise of au-
thority of one sovereign over another "indicate[d] either
superiority of overlordship or active hostility of an equal," '
thereby jeopardizing peaceful coexistence among nations. Conse-
quently, states refrained from exercising jurisdiction over one
another.
In Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro,'5 the Supreme
Court extended the doctrine of absolute immunity to cover govern-
ment-owned merchant ships engaged exclusively in commercial
ventures.16 The Court reasoned that "[a] real sovereign . . . is al-
ways sovereign. In none of its activities is it ever subject to a
higher human will, individual or collective.' 7 Until the twentieth
century, the absolute sovereign immunity doctrine had no excep-
tions in the United States.'8
Internationally, there had emerged a growing concern for indi-
vidual rights and public morality,'9 and a recognition of the need
to redress individual wrongs arising out of a sovereign's commer-
cial activities.2 0 On April 10, 1926, representatives of twenty na-
12. Id. at 137.
13. See Chemical Nat'l Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 215 A.2d 864 (Pa.)
(Musmanno, dissenting), cert. denied 385 U.S. 822 (1966). In his scathing dissent, Judge
Musmanno said "the fiction of [absolute] sovereign immunity had [been] carried on for so
long and . . . with such reverential fear that even with the demise of its principal benefi-
ciary, the aura of supreme authority still endured because one approaches even a dead lion
with a certain sense of respect and awe." Id. at 889.
14. Draft Conventions of the Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 AM.
J. INT'L L. 451, 527 (Supp. 1932) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention].
15. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
16. "[W]hen the [Schooner Exchange] decision was given, merchant ships were operated
only by private owners and there was little thought of governments engaging in such opera-
tions." Id. at 573.
17. Id. at 568-69.
18. Introductory note RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REVISED), at 171 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
19. Lauterpacht, supra note 3 at 250-72. "The restrictive theory appeared in western
continental Europe in the latter part of the 19th century." N. LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEE-
NEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 316 (1973) [hereinafter cited as INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL SYSTEM].
20. At the World Economic Conference of 1927, the Conference recommended:
That, when a Government carries on or controls any commercial, industrial,
banking, maritime transport or other enterprise, it shall not, in its character as
such and in so far as it participates in enterprises of this kind be treated as enti-
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tions (but not the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics) signed the Brussels Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Concerning the Immunities of State-Owned Ships.2
This document subjected government-owned merchant vessels that
came within the signatory nations' jurisdictions to the same rules
of liability as applied to private commercial vessels.
Eventually, serious criticism arose in the United States of the
absolute sovereign immunity doctrine as a doctrine that "invade[d]
with impunity [individual] rights otherwise protected by the law of
the land. '22 United States courts became more sensitive to the
changing international attitudes as foreign governments substan-
tially increased their participation in United States and other in-
ternational commercial markets.2 8 Penetration by foreign sover-
eigns' carriers correspondingly increased the potential injury to the
private entrepeneur. In response, the United States courts at-
tempted to restrict the applicability of the absolute sovereign im-
munity theory.2
Traditionally, immunity had been asserted by the foreign sover-
eign in a special appearance in the United States courts. As the
courts attempted to restrict the applicability of immunity, foreign
tled to any sovereign rights, privileges or immunities from taxation or from other
liabilities to which similar privately owned undertakings are subject, it being
clearly understood that this recommendation only applies to ordinary commercial
enterprises in time of peace.
Draft Convention, supra note 14, at 607 (citations omitted).
21. See E. ALLEN, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN STATES BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS 303-08
(1933).
22. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 246. See also Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States
When Engaged in Commercial Enterprises: A Proposed Solution 27 MICH. L. REV. 751, 775
(1929).
Mr. Hervey suggested as a solution that international agreements, such as The Interna-
tional Convention on the Transport of Goods by Rail, and the Treaties of Versailles and St.
Germain, viable examples of international agreements, be used as patterns to fashion an
international agreement-to which the United States should be a party-in which a sover-
eign who engaged in commercial activity renounced its immunity. As an alternative, he ad-
monished that Congress enact a law
expressly resuming all jurisdiction which has been impliedly or tacity lost, and if
necessary, the establishment of a special tribunal for the interpretation and en-
forcement of the law, [which] would be in consonance with justice, and would offer
the most speedy and effective solution of the 'immunity' difficulties inherent in
the commercial undertakings of foreign states.
23. International Economic Report of the President 56 (1975).
24. For jurisdictional purposes, the courts drew distinctions based on possession/non-
possession of a vessel, see, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); The Katingo Hadji-
patera, 40 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 119 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 313 U.S. 593
(1941); or incorporation/non-incorporation of a government agency, see, e.g., The Uxmal, 40
F. Supp. 258 (D. Mass. 1941); United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d
199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
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sovereigns employed an alternative method to claim immunity and
circumvent suit. This alternative method, known as a "recognition
and allowance," became common in the early part of this century.
A "recognition and allowance" occurred when a foreign sovereign
asserted its immunity claim to the Department of State. The De-
partment of State in turn requested the Department of Justice to
suggest immunity to the court. The court was required then to rec-
ognize the sovereign as immune and dismiss the suit.2 5 In effect,
the "recognition and allowance" procedure transferred the immu-
nity determination from the judiciary to the State Department.
The deference by the courts to the executive branch was mandated
by the Supreme Court's opinions in Ex parte Peru26 and in Mexico
v. Hoffman.27
In Ex parte Peru, a foreign sovereign's vessel was attached in a
breach of contract action. The Republic of Peru filed a claim of
immunity which was formally recognized by the State Department
and moved the district court for release of the vessel. The court
denied the motion holding that the petitioner had waived its im-
munity by making a general appearance in the suit. On appeal, the
Supreme Court held that "[u]pon the submission of this certifica-
tion [of immunity] to the district court, it became the court's duty
• . . to release the vessel and to proceed no further in the cause."'28
In Hoffman, a libel in rem action was brought against the Baja
California, a vessel operated by a Mexican corporation but owned
by the Mexican government. Although the State Department was
aware of the government ownership, it would not recognize and al-
low a claim of foreign sovereign immunity. The Court noted that
its actions in the matter could affect the relationship between the
State Department and Mexico, but, because the State Department
would not enlarge the doctrine, the Court refused to extend the
immunity. The Court rationalized its position in Hoffman as nec-
essary in order to preclude "embarass[ment to] the executive arm
in its conduct of foreign affairs."'
Unfortunately, transferring the immunity determination to the
State Department relegated the aggrieved individual's right of ac-
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 18, at 172.
26. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
27. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
28. 318 U.S. at 589. This judicial deference, according to Chief Justice Stone, was
"founded upon the policy... that our national interest will be better served in such cases
if the wrongs to suitors, involving our relations with a friendly foreign power, are righted
through diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compulsions of judicial proceedings." Id.
29. 324 U.S. at 35.
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cess to the courts to an inferior position. In judicial proceedings,
freed from political pressures, the immunity determination could
have been made based on an equitable balancing of the parties'
interests. As a politically sensitive institution, however, the State
Department was more likely to yield to diplomatic pressures
brought about to avoid any affront to sovereign prestige. Its goal
was to maintain amicable international relations and preclude fric-
tion. Individual rights held a secondary role.80
After World War II, the State Department realigned its position
to conform to the international trend of "restrictive sovereign im-
munity."8" The State Department reasoned that it was inconsistent
to grant immunity to a foreign sovereign when the United States
subjected itself to suit in its own courts. Moreover, the United
States, when engaged in commercial ventures overseas, did not
claim sovereign immunity in the foreign jurisdiction. And finally,
the Department felt that persons engaged in commercial enter-
prises with a foreign sovereign should be allowed to have their
rights determined by the judiciary.8"
The State Department set forth its official position in a letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the Acting Attorney
General.83 The "Tate letter" classified the acts of a foreign sover-
eign as either jure imperii or jure gestionis. When a foreign sover-
eign acted jure imperii, it retained its immunity because its acts
were public acts. When it acted jure gestionis, the immunity was
forfeited because the acts were classified as private.35
Ultimately, Congress codified the restrictive theory in the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.3 The FSIA returned the
30. Even when it had been alleged that the State Department acted arbitrarily, the
courts refused to review the determination. Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir.
1974). Likewise, in Chemical Nat'l Resources, 215 A.2d at 869, the court said that the State
Department immunity determination "is conclusive no matter how unwise or, in a particular
case how unfair or unjust the Department's determination appears to be."
31. RESTATEMENT supra note 18, at 172-73.
32. 26 Dept. State Bull. 984, 985 (1952).
33. Id. at 984. The Tate letter is reproduced in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba,
425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976).
34. Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971). In Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354,
360, the court considered as public acts only those which were:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien.
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization.
(3) acts concerning the armed forces.
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity.
(5) public loans.
35. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 19, at 322-33.
36. FSIA, supra note 1 at 6605-06. This act has four objectives:
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immunity determination to the judiciary,3 7 releasing the State De-
partment from the "awkward position of a political institution try-
ing to apply a legal standard to litigation already before the courts
[especially when] . . .it does not have the machinery to take evi-
dence, to hear witnesses, or to afford appellate review. ' 8
II. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b)
In establishing the standards for resolving foreign immunity
questions, Congress was aware of a national/international tension.
It recognized a need to reduce diplomatic irritation (arising from
shotgun attachments of assets necessary to obtain jurisdiction over
a foreign sovereign), and yet to insure the injured party a forum in
which to seek redress." Accordingly, section 1605(b) was drafted to
permit a plaintiff to bring suit against a foreign state. This statute
was adopted to give the court in personam jurisdiction over the
foreign sovereign (which thereby rendered prior attachment of a
sovereign's property unnecessary), and, if the sovereign was not
immune, to allow the plaintiff to secure an adjudication on his
claim.40
A. The Sovereign State or Entity
The first case to construe section 1605(b) as it applied to a mari-
time attachment of a foreign sovereign's vessel was Jet Line. Jet
1. To codify the restrictive immunity theory;
2. To transfer the immunity determination from the executive to judicial
branch;
3. To provide for in personam jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign and render
unnecessary in rem proceedings against a foreign sovereign's property;
4. To provide for a remedy for a judgment creditor should the foreign sover-
eign fail to satisfy a final judgment.
37. It was the State Department's intention to limit itself to amicus curiae briefs. Public
Notice No. 507 of the Department of State of the United States of America, 41 Fed. Reg.
50883 (1976).
However, commentators questioned whether the State Department would "resist the im-
portunings of foreign governments and whether the courts [would], or lawfully [could], ig-
nore express desires of the State Department" in the future. Brower, Bistline, & Loomis,
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 In Practice, 73 Am. J. INT'L L. 200, 206
(1979). See Yessenin-Volpin v. Novosti Press Agency, 443 F. Supp. 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
38. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6607. See generally Martropico Compania Naviera S.A.
v. Pertamina, 428 F. Supp. 1035, 1037 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
39. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6626. The principle of sovereign immunity had been
alleged to have given a foreign sovereign an unfair competitive advantage over private com-
mercial entrepeneurs. The Cristina, 1938 A.C. 485, 521-22.
40. Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 489 F. Supp. 526, 529 (E.D. Va. 1980), afl'd, 653
F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981).
41. 462 F. Supp. 1165.
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Line Services sought to recover damages for services it rendered in
cleaning up oil spills from the MN Marsa El Hariga in August
1977 and from the MN Elrakwa in October of the same year. Jet
Line Services intervened in an in rem action in which the Elrakwa
had been arrested.42
At the time of the Elrakwa's arrest, Jet Line also instituted suit
against MN Marsa El Hariga and her owner, whom Jet Line erro-
neously alleged in its complaint to be the National Oil Company of
Libya. Jet Line also erroneously alleged that the National Oil
Company of Libya had an interest in the Elrakwa.43 The Elrakwa
was worth $24,000,000. Jet Line sought a maritime attachment and
garnishment against it to insure jurisdiction, and ultimately to se-
cure satisfaction of Jet Line's $91,310 claim against the National
Oil Company of Libya for cleanup services provided the MN
Marsa El Hariga." In fact, the General National Maritime Trans-
portation Company (GNMTC), from 1977 to the date of the suits,
had continuously owned both MN Elrakwa and MN Marsa El
Hariga. On discovery of its error, Jet Line moved successfully to
amend its complaint to name the correct owner.45
Because sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense,46
GNMTC in turn offered prima facie evidence of its immunity7 in
a special appearance before the court. GNMTC moved to dismiss
the arrest of the Elrakwa claiming the attachment improper and
void." The district court granted the motion to dismiss, and held
that based on section 1605(b) Jet Line forfeited both its in rem
and in personam actions "for all times."49
The FSIA initially clothes a "foreign state" with immunity from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.5 The term "for-
42. Promet Marine Services Corp. v. Elrakwa, Civil No. Y-78-62 (D. Md. 1978) cited in
462 F. Supp. at 1166-67.
43. 462 F. Supp. at 1167.
44. Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, the property of a foreign sovereign could not be
retained to satisfy a judgment because it had been traditionally immune from execution.
Leigh, supra note 2, at 2364.
Section 1610 (a) and (b) of the FSIA, however, modified the immunity from execution to
conform to the provisions on jurisdictional immunity. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6626.
45. 462 F. Supp. at 1167.
46. H.R. RE"., supra note 1, at 6616.
47. GNMTC submitted affidavits, supporting documents from the Department of State
verifying an affiant's status, a photocopied page from Lloyd's Register of Ships, and other
material. 462 F. Supp. at 1172.
48. Id. at 1167.
49. Id. at 1177.
50. This section was written "in a manner consistent with the way in which the law of
sovereign immunity has developed." H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6616.
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eign state" is not limited in meaning to a foreign state per se.51
When any entity can demonstrate by prima facie evidence that it
(1) . . . is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) . . . is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) . . . is neither a citizen of a State of the United States as
defined in section 1332(c) and (d) of this title, nor created under
the laws of any third country,"
it falls within the definition of an "agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state" and is embraced within the "foreign state" defini-
tion. Though GNMTC was not a foreign state per se, in Carey v.
National Oil Corp., the court held it to be an "agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state.""3
B. Commercial Activity
Although GNMTC fell within the statutory definition of a for-
eign state, the grant of immunity was neither absolute nor auto-
matic. Since the shipping activity was of a commercial nature,
GNMTC could become subject to the in personam jurisdiction of
the United States' courts. The court in Jet Line, however, chose
not to deal with this distinction."
In China National Chemical Import & Export Corp. v. M/V
Lago Hualaihue,55 the court specifically did construe this provi-
sion. In China National Chemical, the plaintiffs owned and in-
sured a cargo of chemical fertilizer which was being transported
from the United States to China on the M/V Sapporo Olympics.
The vessel, M/V Lago Hualaihue, owned by the Empresa Mari-
tima del Estado, a Chilean government merchant marine, collided
51. Id. at 6613. Only under § 1608 does the term "foreign state" refer to the foreign state
itself. In all other sections of the chapter, "foreign state" includes political subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976). 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) and (d) (1976) provides:
(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title, a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of
the State where it has its principal place of business.
(d) The word "States", as used in this section, includes the Territories, the
District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
53. 453 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The district court found that GNMTC
succeeded General Maritime Transport Organization which was a wholly government-owned
Libyan entity.
54. 462 F. Supp. at 1172-73.
55. 504 F. Supp. 684 (D. Md. 1981).
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with the Sapporo Olympics in international waters off Panama, al-
legedly causing approximately a million and a half dollars of dam-
age. The plaintiffs looked for redress of the maritime tort under
section 1605(b).5' The defendants argued that when Congress
wrote the clause "which maritime lien is based upon a commercial
activity of the foreign state" it did not intend that a maritime tort
of this nature be included within section 1605(b); rather, the words
"based upon" instead of "in connection with" or "arose out of"
limited the jurisdiction of the United States' courts over a foreign
state to instances where there was a commercial relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and the foreign state.57
The district court, however, held that Congress did not intend to
limit section 1605(b) to those cases in which there is a commercial
relationship between the foreign sovereign and the injured party;"
rather, Congress intended that "the term 'commercial activity'...
[includes] a broad spectrum of endeavor."' 9 Consequently, the op-
eration by a foreign sovereign of a commercial vessel which caused
a maritime tort was sufficient to trigger section 1605(b): "Congress
intended to allow [a party] . . to bring an action under § 1605(b)
where the alleged maritime tort lien arises out of a commercial ac-
tivity for a foreign state; e.g., the operation of a commercial cargo
vessel as distinguished from the operation of a naval vessel."60 This
distinction appears to be a return to the public versus the private
act distinction employed by the State Department prior to the en-
actment of the FSIA. 1
The court premised its holding on the analysis of the FSIA. The
term "commercial activity" can have two meanings: It could mean
"either [1] a regular course of commercial conduct or [2] a particu-
lar commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an
activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by
reference to its purpose."'
The term "regular course of commercial conduct" is self-explan-
56. Id. at 686.
57. Id. at 689.
58. Id.
59. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6614.
60. 504 F. Supp. at 689.
61. Indeed, this very distinction had been attempted by M. Weiss, a judge of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in 1923. "The test. . . is not whether the transaction is
aimed at achieving an object directly connected with the political functions of the state as a
sovereign entity . . ., the test is whether . . . the juridical nature of the transaction is such
that it can be entered into by an individual." Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 225.
62. 504 F. Supp. at 686.
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atory; it includes any activity customarily carried on for profit. On
the other hand, the meaning of the phrase a "particular commer-
cial transaction or act," is not as readily apparent. In elaborating
its views on what is encompassed within the term "transaction or
act," Congress asked whether the contract made by a foreign sov-
ereign was of the same character as that which an individual could
make. If so, the sovereign's acts are commercial activity regardless
of whether the ultimate purpose of the activity is a public
purpose.63
It was necessary to preclude immunity for a foreign sovereign
engaged in commercial activity which had a public purpose be-
cause "[i]n a real sense all acts jure gestionis are acts jure im-
perii." Otherwise, there would be a reversion to the absolute im-
munity grant of Berizzi Brothers." Moreover, in its section
analysis Congress expressly avoided a precise definition of the term
"commercial activity," choosing instead to give the judiciary much
latitude in its determination."
The coupling of the private-person inquiry with the great leeway
accorded the court in defining commercial activity sustains the
holding in China National Chemical. The result reached is consis-
tent with the congressional intent to narrowly limit foreign sover-
eign immunity in the economic sphere.
In Jet Line, the commercial activity exception to foreign sover-
eign immunity was applicable because GNMTC was created for
the purpose of engaging in all facets of the petroleum business67-a
regular course of commercial conduct engaged in for profit.
Though China National Chemical held that it was not necessary
to show a commercial relationship between the injured party and
the foreign sovereign, a more compelling argument for the applica-
bility of the commercial activity definition could have been made
in Jet Line because GNMTC had contracted with Jet Line for
cleanup services.
63. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6615.
64. Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 224.
65. 271 U.S. at 568-69.
66. See 653 F.2d at 817 n.7, in which the court said:
Congress deliberately left the distinction between commercial and governmental
activities open for judicial adumbration on a case-by-case basis. The legislative
history indicates that if the activity is one in which a private entity could engage,
it is not entitled to immunity, even if the contract seeks to procure goods for a
governmental purpose.(citations omitted).
67. 462 F. Supp. at 1172.
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C. Attachment-Strict vs. Liberal Approach
Although GNMTC had lost its immunity, the court in Jet Line
held that it did not have jurisdiction over GNMTC. The district
court premised its holding on the FSIA's legislative analysis which
stated that "[i]f, however, the vessel or its cargo is arrested or at-
tached, the plaintiff will lose his in personam remedy and the for-
eign state will be entitled to immunity-except in the case where
the plaintiff was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state
was involved."'
Jet Line had contended that neither its president nor any of its
corporate officers had knowledge of this Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act and, lacking in-house counsel, had no occasion to be ad-
vised of the statute's existence. The court held that ignorance of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was no excuse; 9 Jet Line
furnished services to vessels both domestic and foreign, and should
have been aware of possible complications arising from its interac-
tions with foreign ships.7 0 The court stated that to allow Jet Line
to prevail because of its "ignorance" would be to allow an "attach
first, ask later" policy which would undermine the policies of the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 71
Jet Line also claimed, to no avail, that it was unaware that a
foreign sovereign was involved. By invoking this safety clause built
into the statute, Jet Line tried to salvage the in personam rem-
edy.7 12 The court looked to the FSIA legislative analysis, which
stated that the use of this clause should be rare, because foreign
ownership is easily ascertained from ship registers, the flag of the
vessel, or the circumstances giving rise to the maritime lien.78 The
district court pointed out that in Lloyd's Register of Shipping
GNMTC is listed as the owner of the MN Marsa El Hariga and
68. H.R. REP. supra note 1, at 6620.
69. 462 F. Supp. at 1176. See, e.g., Lawder v. Stone, 187 U.S. 281, 293 (1902).
70. The court reached this conclusion based on Jet Line's complaint which stated that
Jet Line was "in the business among other things of furnishing services to merchant ves-
sels." 462 F. Supp. at 1175. The Supreme Court has held that a party which engages in a
commercial venture is conclusively presumed to know the law. Mammoth Oil Co. v. United
States, 275 U.S. 13, 54 (1927).
71. 462 F. Supp. at 1176. In fact, the court pointed out that the FSIA had been pub-
lished and had been effective for almost a year prior to the date of the suit. Id. Conse-
quently, Jet Line had adequate opportunities to avail itself of knowledge of the contents of
the FSIA had it so chosen.
72. Jet Line mistakenly named the National Oil Company as the defendant instead of
GNMTC. The court said that, nevertheless, this mistake was not indicative of Jet Line's
ignorance of a foreign state's involvement because both entities were organs of the Libyan
government. Id. at 1175.
73. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6620-21.
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M/V Elrakwa, and "GNMTC" are the initials of the General Na-
tional Maritime Transport Company of Tripoli, Libya. The court
was mindful that simply because the company was listed as "of
Tripoli, Libya," the designation may not have been dispositive that
GNMTC was a foreign sovereign or an instrument thereof. It
pointed out, however, that under the heading "GNMTC," the
Shipping List of Shipowners also said "See Government of
Libya.17 4 Hence, Jet Line had imputed knowledge of the foreign
sovereign ownership of both vessels. Therefore, the court held that
because Jet Line failed to comply with the procedures explained in
section 1605(b), it forfeited both its in personam and in rem ac-
tions and dismissed the suit.
7
'
This holding is in keeping with the legislative intent of balancing
the interests of the foreign sovereign against those of the injured
party. But for Jet Line's own actions, there would not have been a
forfeiture. Jet Line could have availed itself of the information
necessary to comply with the statutory procedure. Detaining the
Elrakwa created unjustifiable inconvenience and expense for the
foreign sovereign. In fact, Jet Line's attachment of the Elrakwa, by
the needless pre-statutory method of initiating a lawsuit, was an
example of the "shotgun approach" which Congress wanted to stop
in order to reduce diplomatic irritation. 6
In an unreported case, Comite Assureurs Maritimes Marseilles
v. State of Madhya Pradesh," the District Court for the Northern
District of Florida also took a strict approach, but unlike Jet Line
did not reach a statutorily justifiable result. In Comite, the plain-
tiff, a foreign insurance company, had issued a policy to cover cas-
ualty loss for a large quantity of peanuts which were to be trans-
ported on the vessel State of Madhya Pradesh. During transport,
the peanuts were damaged by fire and water.7 ' Alleging negligence,
the plaintiff-insuror sought to have the vessel attached and sold to
recover the monies for which it had become obligated to its in-
74. 462 F. Supp. at 1176. The court also noted that the ships flew the flag of Libya.
Congress cited this as an indication of ownership. H.R. REP, supra note 1 at 6620. However,
this is subject to question because the flag commonly indicates only nation of registry.
75. Id. at 1177.
76. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6626. The section-by-section analysis is replete with lan-
guage which evidences congressional intent to preclude attachment as a means of initiating
a suit. For example, "[S]ection 1605(b) is designed to avoid arrests of vessels ...to com-
mence a suit." Id. at 6620. "[O]ne of the fundamental purposes of this bill is to provide a
long-arm statute that makes attachment for jurisdictional purposes unnecessary." Id. at
6626.
77. No. MCA 81-0215 (N.D. Fla., July 13, 1981).
78. Complaint at V, No. MCA 81-0215.
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sured. The vessel was attached, but subsequently released on a
bond under which The Shipping Corporation of India, Ltd., owner
of the Madhya Pradesh, assumed liability.7 9
The defendant in rem, Madhya Pradesh, and the claimant, The
Shipping Corporation of India, Ltd., moved for a dismissal with
prejudice. They alleged that Comite, the plaintiff, had forfeited
any cause of action it might have had because it improperly seized
the Madhya Pradesh in violation of the procedures set out in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. In addition, they argued that
Lloyd's Register of Shipping showed the vessel to be owned by
The Shipping Corporation of India, Ltd. and that prior to the
plaintiff's seizure of the vessel, Comite had obtained actual knowl-
edge of the identity of the seized vessel's owner, through (1) a tele-
phone conversation with Mr. Healy (the president of Lamonte,
Burns & Company, Inc., a United States commercial correspon-
dent for the vessel's underwriter) and (2) a telex from Mr. Wood
(the attorney representing the vessel's underwriter).80 In essence,
defendants alleged that the clause in section 1605(b) permitting a
plaintiff to maintain his in personam action when he could show he
"was unaware that the vessel . . .of a foreign sovereign was in-
volved," 81 was inapplicable.
Plaintiff in turn alleged that prior to the vessel's attachment, he
had no "actual knowledge. ' 82 He contended that the main purpose
of the telephone call with Mr. Healy was to further attempt to ne-
gotiate security to avoid the arrest of the Madhya Pradesh, and
that the telex sent him was equivocal because it indicated that Mr.
Wood "understood," rather than actually knew that the vessel was
"owned by the government of India, or an arm or agency
thereof."83
79. Release of Vessel, id.
80. Motion To Dismiss, id. See also Supplemental Memorandum In Support of Motion
to Dismiss. In addition to the Supplemental Memorandum, the claimant filed the original
affidavits of Nicholas J. Healy, Jr., the U.S. commercial correspondent, and Captain
Devinder Singh, the defendant vessel's U.S. representative. The defendants contended that
Mr. Healy's affidavit, together with the telex from Mr. Wood, which was dated the day
before the vessel was attached by the plaintiff, conclusively established that the plaintiff
had actual knowledge of the ownership of the vessel by a foreign sovereign. Id. Except for
these conclusory allegations, the pleadings do not explicitly show how such knowledge is
"established."
The affidavit of Captain Singh, the offical United States representative of The Shipping
Corporation of India, Ltd., likewise was alleged to have conclusively established that the
vessel was owned by an instrumentality of the sovereign foreign state of India. Id.
81. H.R. R"s., supra note 1, at 6620.
82. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, No. MCA 81-0215.
83. Review of the pleadings reveals that the plaintiffs believed the arrest was necessary
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Further, plaintiff contended that it could not be established
from information contained in the shipowners register and the ship
register that the government of India owned or controlled the cor-
poration which owned the Madhya Pradesh.8" Plaintiff alleged
that, in fact, it was not until late in the judicial proceedings that
he learned that "the vessel as we now know, [was] apparently not
owned by the government of India, but the vessel [was] owned by a
corporation whose shares are entirely owned by the foreign sover-
eign state of India." 85 The plaintiff maintained that he did not for-
feit his in personam claim.
The district court granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice,
as filed pursuant to section 1605(b)." Juxtaposing Jet Line to
Comite in light of congressional intent, it is difficult to understand
why the district court in Comite reached this result. Section
1605(b) sought to implement new procedures to obtain jurisdiction
over a foreign sovereign who caused a wrong in the economic
sphere. This section was not meant to deprive an injured party of
his substantive rights.87
In Comite, the ship's registry did not list "State of Madhya
Pradesh" with those ships owned by the government of India.
Rather, Lloyd's Register of Shipping listed "State of Madhya
Pradesh" under the heading, "The Shipping Corporation of India,
Ltd." The register failed to state that The Shipping Corporation of
India, Ltd. was an instrumentality or agency of the Indian
government."8
The section-by-section analysis of FSIA states that "evidence
that a party had relied on a standard registry of ships, which did
not reveal a foreign state's interest in a vessel, would be prima
facie evidence of the party's unawareness that a vessel of a foreign
state was involved." 8' 9 Since there was only an "understanding"
that the vessel was owned by a foreign sovereign, coupled with the
because the initial negotiations between the underwriters for the Comite and Mr. Wood
were unsuccessful, and the vessel's departure from the jurisdiction was imminent. Affidavit
of Julian Bennett, id.
84. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, id.
85. Plaintiff contended foreign ownership was not conclusively established until a state-
ment by a representative from the Indian Embassy certifying The Shipping Corporation of
India, Ltd. as an organ of the State of India and owner of the State of Madhya Pradesh was
included with the pleadings on June 17, 1981. Letter of R.N.N. Choudhury, see id.
86. Order, id.
87. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on HR 11315
Before the Subcommittee on Administrative and Governmental Relations of the House Ju-!
diciary Committee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1976).
88. 1980-1981 LLOYD'S REGISTER OF SHIPPING 305-06.
89. H.R. REP., supra note 1, at 6621 (emphasis added).
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fact that the ship registry neither, designated the government of
India as the owner nor designated the shipping corporation as
wholly-owned by India (unlike Jet Line in which under the head-
ing, "GNMTC," the registry said "See Government of Libya") the
court, by a literal interpretation of the statute, could have found in
personam jurisdiction under the exception in section 1605(b)(1). 0
Moreover Comite, unlike Jet Line, did not involve the mischief
which the statute was designed to remedy-shotgun attachments
of a variety of foreign sovereign assets to initiate suit. Rather, the
only asset that was attached was the very asset which gave rise to
the tort.
In light of the statute's purpose, its history, and the social and
economic factors which gave rise to its- enactment, there is no rea-
son why the district court could not have rendered a decision op-
posite that which it rendered. Though the court premised its hold-
ing on Jet Line, its resolution, unlike the resolution in Jet Line,
worked a penalty on a plaintiff who was not feigning ignorance of
foreign sovereign ownership.
In Velidor v. LIPIG Benghazi,91 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit focused on congressional purpose when seamen, who
wanted to press a wage claim against the owner of the vessel, failed
to comply with the formal process standards of section 1605(b)(2).
In Velidor the plaintiffs, who were Yugoslavian seamen on board
the L/P/G Benghazi, became dissatisfied with the manner in which
they were paid by the owner of the Benghazi, Compagnie Algero-
Libyenne de Transport Maritime (CALTRAM), an instrumentality
of the Algeria/Libya governments. While at sea, the seamen
radioed CALTRAM that they wanted to be relieved of duty and
paid in full all wages due and owing when the ship arrived in Cam-
den, New Jersey.92
When the ship reached Camden, the seamen brought suit be-
cause CALTRAM did not make the payments which the seamen
alleged were due them under the Seamen's Wage Act. 3 To prevent
the vessel from leaving the port, they successfully sought to have
90. Even if Comite had not fallen within the letter of the statute, the court could have
looked to the spirit of the statute in order reach this result. "A large number of American
decisions, and especially the modern cases, have subscribed to the doctrine extending or
restricting the literal expression of a statute according to the spirit and policy of the legisla-
tion." J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 54.03 (4th ed., 1973).
91. 653 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 814.
93. The Seamen's Wage Act was enacted to insure (1) that the seamen would not be
denied their wages and turned ashore to become public charges, and (2) to equalize the
operational costs of vessels both foreign and domestic. 653 F.2d at 818-19.
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the vessel arrested.
At a hearing on March 17, 1980, CALTRAM established itself as
an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign and sought immunity
under FSIA. The court released the Benghazi from arrest, but
ruled that it had in personam jurisdiction over CALTRAM under
section 1605(b) of the FSIA.'
On April 3, 1980, CALTRAM moved to have the March 17 order
vacated and the complaint dismissed because the plaintiffs did not
comply with both notice provisions of section 1605(b).9 5 Section
1605(b)(1) requires delivery of notice to the person having posses-
sion of the vessel, and section 1605(b)(2) requires that notice must
be given to the foreign sovereign itself in compliance with the pro-
visions set out in section 1608(b)(2).6
40 D 6262 Realty Corp. v. United Arab Emirates Government,97
interpreted the notice requirement of section 1608. In 40 D 6262
Realty Corp., the petitioners had attached a copy of the "notice of
petition" to the premises of the foreign sovereign and in addition
had mailed a copy of the petition to the Permanent Mission of the
United Arab Emirates Government. The district court held that
this was not a permissible manner of service under section 1608.98
Section 1608 requires that there be transmitted a "notice of the
suit," rather than "notice of the petition." Further, the transmit-
ted summons and complaint must be in the official language of the
foreign sovereign." The legislative rationale was that
[a] "notice of suit" as used in this section would advise a for-
eign state of the legal proceeding, it would explain the legal sig-
nificance of the summons, complaint and service, and it would
indicate what steps are available under or required by U.S. law in
order to defend the action. In short, it would provide an introduc-
tory explanation to a foreign state that may be unfamiliar with
94. 653 F.2d at 814-15.
95. Id. at 816.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 1608(b)(2) (1976) states that:
(b) Service in the courts of the United States and of the States shall be made
upon an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state:
(2) if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the sum-
mons and complaint either to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to
any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process in the United States; or in accordance with an applicable interna-
tional convention on service of judicial documents. ...
97. 447 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
98. Id. at 711.
99. Id.
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U.S. law or procedures. 00
The court said that "[u]ntil proper service is effected," 101 it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case. Nevertheless, the court appeared
willing to entertain the suit in the future since it instructed the
"petitioners . . . [to] proceed to serve respondent in accordance
with the requirements of 28 U.S.C., section 1608. ' '1i0
The Jet Line court said in dicta, citing 40 D 6262 Realty Corp.,
that "[tihe Immunities Act would allow an in personam action for
a maritime lien only as long as the provisions for notice under Sec-
tion 1605(b)(1) and (2) are followed."103
The plaintiffs in Velidor admitted that they gave notice only to
the master of the Benghazi.1 " Nevertheless, the court skirted this
omission. It would not dismiss the suit; instead, it found jurisdic-
tion under section 1605(a)(2).1 0 It read section 1605(b) restric-
tively, holding that the second notice prong, sending a summons
and complaint to the foreign sovereign itself, related only to mari-
time liens arising under section 1605(b). It found the master of the
Benghazi to be the agent of the owner, and notice to the agent to
be notice to CALTRAM. 106 Consequently, there was the requisite
service of process and subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute
that gave the district court in personam jurisdiction.1 07
This holding, unlike Comite, used procedure effectively to imple-
ment the underlying purpose of the FSIA. It refused "to impose on
plaintiffs a procedural burden at odds with the avowed congres-
sional desire to expand the means of serving process on the instru-
mentalities of foreign sovereigns."108 The ruling of the court on ser-
vice of process provided an injured party a forum for redress.
100. H.R. Rap., supra note 1, at 6623.
101. 447 F. Supp. at 712.
102. Id.
103. 462 F. Supp. at 1177 (emphasis added).
104. 653 F.2d at 816.
105. Id. at 815, 821. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1976) provides that:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the
United States or of the States in any case-
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in
the United States by the foreign state;. . . or upon an act outside the terri-
tory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the
foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States....
106. 653 F.2d at 821.
107. Id. at 817.
108. Id. at 817.
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III. CONCLUSION
The history of foreign sovereign immunity evidenced an early
predisposition toward providing the foreign sovereign with a shield
from suit. As societies developed, and the rights of the individual
were recognized, limitations were placed on the immunity of sover-
eigns who engaged in commercial ventures.
In the United States, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) was enacted to free a
sovereign's assets from shotgun attachments and yet provide the
injured individual access to the courts. While case law construing
this section is minimal, it appears that there are two approaches to
the procedural formalities specified by statute. While these ap-
proaches may appear to conflict, in fact they do not. They reflect
instead an underlying balancing of competing interests made by
the judiciary in an atmosphere freed from the political pressures
exerted by the executive branch.

